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Volume 12 Fall 1994 Number 1
NOTE
Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v.
Eastman Kodak Co.: The Second
Circuit Affirms the NPDES Permit
as a Shield and Tries to Sink
the Clean Water Act
JOANNA BOWEN*
The article examines a Second Circuit Court of Appeals de-
cision in which the court held that a National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit issued
under the Clean Water Act (CWA) shielded an industrial
discharger from an enforcement action for discharging pol-
lutants not listed on the permit and that if state law in-
cludes a prohibition from discharging pollutants not listed
on the permit, it is not enforceable by citizen plaintiffs. The
author asserts that the court misinterpreted both the CWA
and EPA's policy on the scope of a NPDES permit, and is-
* The author wishes to thank the attorneys for both parties who provided
research materials for this article, Professor Jeffrey Miller and fellow student
Matthew Atkinson for their helpful comments during the writing process, and
members of the Pace Environmental Law Review for their efforts in publishing
the article. The author also expresses love and appreciation to the men in her
life - John, Sam, Gray, Russ, and Jack, for their love and support for their wife
and mother on her trek through law school.
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sued an opinion that frustrates Congressional intent be-
hind the CWA The article examines the NPDES permit
application, discusses the history of litigation between the
parties and examines the Second Circuit decision.
In Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman Ko-
dak Co.,' the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a
lower court decision 2 holding that a citizen suit may not be
brought pursuant to section 505 of the Clean Water Act
(CWA)3 to enjoin the discharge of pollutants that were not
listed in a state permit issued according to the CWA.4 The
court held that the discharge of pollutants not listed in a
valid, state issued CWA permit does not violate the CWA.5 In
addition, the court held that even if state law prohibits the
discharge of pollutants not listed in a permit, citizen plain-
tiffs are not authorized by section 505 to bring an enforce-
ment action because such a state requirement would be
broader than the requirements of the CWA. 6
At issue is the legal significance of a National (or State)
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES or SPDES)
permit. Citizen groups argue that the CWA prohibits the dis-
charge of pollutants without a permit and that a permit
grants authorization to discharge only those pollutants ex-
pressly listed on the permit in amounts not exceeding permit
limits. 7 Under this narrow interpretation of the scope of a
1. Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 F.3d
353 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3238 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1994) (No. 93-
1839).
2. Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 809 F.
Supp. 1040 (W.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd, 12 F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 63
U.S.L.W. 3238 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1994) (No. 93-1839).
3. Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988)
[hereinafter CWA].
4. New York State Pollution Discharge Elimination System (SPDES) per-
mits are issued pursuant to N.Y. EIwrL. CONSERV. LAw § 17-0815 (McKinney
1984).
5. Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 F.3d
353, 354 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3238 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1994) (No.
93-1839).
6. Id.
7. Amicus Brief of Natural Resources Defense Council, American Littoral
Society, Columbia Basin Institute, Raymond Proffitt Foundation, Public Inter-
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss1/11
NPDES PERMIT
permit, the discharge of a pollutant in an amount exceeding
the permitted limit or the discharge of any pollutant not
listed on the permit is a violation of the permit and of the
CWA and is a proper subject of a citizen suit under CWA sec-
tion 505.
CWA permittees argue that a permit grants a general au-
thorization to discharge, restricting only those pollutants ex-
pressly limited in the permit.8 They argue that compliance
with the prohibitions and other terms expressly stated in a
permit constitutes compliance with both the permit and the
CWA, shielding the permittee from liability for discharging
other pollutants. 9 Kodak further argued that if New York
law prohibits the discharge of pollutants for which no effluent
limits have been set, the state law lacks a counterpart in fed-
eral law and thus is not enforceable by the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) or by private citizens. 10
Dischargers argue that it is impossible to monitor every
pollutant in their waste streams, and that if a NPDES permit
is defined to allow the discharge of only those pollutants spe-
cifically limited on the permit, compliance with a permit will
be impossible and permittees will be vulnerable to enforce-
ment actions despite their efforts to obey the law.11 They ar-
gue that such a narrow interpretation of a permit would
overwhelm the permitting authorities and bring the permit-
ting process to a standstill because dischargers would de-
mand that effluent limitations be established for every
est Research Group of New Jersey, Oregon Environmental Council, Oregon
Natural Resources Council, Delaware Riverkeeper, New Jersey/New York
Baykeeper, San Francisco Baykeeper and Hudson Riverkeeper Fund, in Sup-
port of Appellant at 7, Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 12 F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 1993) (No. 93-7091) [hereinafter Amicus Brief in Sup-
port of Appellant].
8. Amicus Brief of the Chemical Manufacturers Association, The Chamber
of Commerce of the United States, The American Petroleum Institute, and the
American Forest and Paper Association at 1, Atlantic States Legal Foundation,
Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 1993) (No. 93-7091).
9. Id.
10. Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 33-34, Atlantic States Legal Founda-
tion, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 1993) (No. 93-7091) [here-
inafter Brief for Defendant-Appellee].
11. Id. at 38-39.
1994]
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pollutant potentially discharged, a task they say is impossi-
ble.12 Environmentalists insist that allowing a NPDES per-
mit to act as a shield for the discharge of pollutants not
limited in the permit gives permittees a free hand to dis-
charge unlimited quantities of pollutants and is at odds with
both the plain meaning and the Congressional intent of the
CWA.13
Recent questions regarding the EPA's position on the
scope of the shield associated with NPDES permits prompted
EPA officials to internally circulate a policy statement on the
issue which called for consideration of changes in that policy
and the permitting process. 14 The EPA takes the position
that the NPDES permit shields a permittee from an enforce-
ment action for discharging pollutants listed on the permit
within the limits and conditions stated on the permit and for
discharging those pollutants for which the permit authority
has not established limits or conditions, but which were
clearly identified as present during the permit application
process.15 The EPA plans to propose changes for the munici-
pal application requirements in 1994 and the industrial ap-
plication requirements in 1995.16
12. Id. at 39.
13. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 22-23, Atlantic States Legal Foundation,
Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 1993) (No. 93-7091).
14. Memorandum from Robert Perciasepe, Assistant Administrator for
Water, Steven A. Herman, Assistant Administrator for Enforcement and Jean
C. Nelson, General Counsel to Regional Administrators and Regional Counsel-
ors (July 1, 1994) (on file with the Pace Environmental Law Review) [hereinaf-
ter Perciasepe Memorandum].
15. Id. at 3.
16. Id. at 4. The issue is really one of burden allocation. Environmentalists
argue that the burden should be on the discharger to make a full and accurate
disclosure of all pollutants in the effluent. Amicus Brief in Support of Appel-
lant, supra note 7, at 25. They further argue that if a pollutant that is being
discharged is not addressed on the permit, the burden should be on the dis-
charger to ask the regulatory agency to specifically address that pollutant. Id.
at 28. Dischargers argue that they have fulfilled their burden of disclosure on a
permit application if they disclose the presence of the pollutants the permitting
agency asked about. Brief for Defendant-Appellee, supra note 10, at 18. They
further argue that if a particular pollutant is not addressed on the permit, it
should be assumed that the administrator chose not to limit it. Id. Environ-
mentalists, then, would place the burden on the discharger to disclose and to




a. The Permit Application
An analysis of what the CWA requires of any discharger
begins with the question of whether it discharges a pollutant
requiring a permit. The basic prohibition of the CWA is 33
U.S.C. § 1311(a), CWA section 301(a), which states, "[e]xcept
as in compliance with this section and sections 1312, 1316,
1317, 1328, 1342, and 1344 of this title, the discharge of any
pollutant by any person shall be unlawful."1 7 CWA section
402 sets forth the statutory basis for permits, generally called
NPDES permits, and gives the EPA Administrator authority
to approve state programs to issue state permits, referred to
in New York as SPDES permits.'8 Section 402(k) states that
"[c]ompliance with a permit issued pursuant to this section
shall be deemed compliance for purposes of sections 1319 and
1365 of this title, with sections 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, and
1343 of this title, except any standard imposed under section
1317 of this title for a toxic pollutant injurious to human
health."' 9 Section 1319 pertains to government enforcement
of the CWA,20 and section 1365 pertains to enforcement
through citizen suits.2 1 The other sections encompass differ-
ent methods for establishing effluent limitations in permits. 22
All dischargers of pollutants must get NPDES permits.23
Application forms are provided by the EPA regional adminis-
trator where there is no approved state permitting program,
place the burden on the administrator to ask about pollutants in the discharge
and to limit those that she chooses to limit. The EPA's policy takes a middle
road by placing the burden of full disclosure in an application on the discharger
and requiring the adminstrator to affirmatively state specific limits on the per-
mit or accept as lawful the discharge of any pollutant disclosed in the applica-
tion if it is not limited on the permit.
17. CWA § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (emphasis added).
18. CWA §§ 402(a), (b), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(a), (b).
19. CWA § 402(k), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k).
20. CWA § 309, 33 U.S.C. § 1319.
21. CWA § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365.
22. Section 1311 pertains to effluent limitations, § 1312 to water quality re-
lated effluent limitations, -§ 1316 to national standards of performance, and
§ 1317 pertains to toxic and pretreatment effluent standards. CWA §§ 301, 302,
306, 307, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317.
23. 40 C.F.R. § 122.21(a) (1993).
19941 273
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or by the Director of the state program where there is an ap-
proved state program.24 The NPDES permit specifies effluent
limitations applicable to the permit holder, as well as moni-
toring, reporting and recordkeeping requirements.25
Answers to detailed questions about the facility and its
expected discharges are required on the NPDES permit ap-
plication. 26 In addition, the applicant must provide quantita-
tive data obtained by approved analytical methods pertaining
to specific pollutants to accurately describe effluent charac-
teristics.27 For purposes of this portion of the NPDES permit
application, "an applicant is expected to know or have reason
to believe that a pollutant is present in an effluent based on
an evaluation of the expected use, production, or storage of
the pollutant, or on any previous analyses for the pollu-
tant."28 Each applicant must report such data for specified
pollutants 29 and for additional pollutants as required for its
appropriate industry category. 30 Applicants are also required
to provide such additional information as may be requested
by the Director of the permitting program so that she can rea-
sonably "assess the discharges from the facility to determine
24. Id.
25. CWA §§ 402(a)(2), (b)(2), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(a)(2), (b)(2).
26. Requirements for the NPDES permit application are specified in 40
C.F.R. § 122.21 which is promulgated under the statutory authority granted to
EPA in CWA § 402(a)(1). Information required of applicants includes a descrip-
tion of the activities conducted by the applicant which require it to obtain a
NPDES permit, a listing of all relevant environmental permits received or ap-
plied for by the facility, a topographic map extending one mile beyond the prop-
erty boundaries of the source depicting the facility and each of its intake and
discharge structures, and a description of the nature of the business. 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.21(f)(1)-(8) (1993). In addition, existing manufacturing dischargers must
identify each outfall location, provide a line drawing of the water flow through
the facility with a water balance showing operations contributing wastewater to
the effluent and treatment units, provide a narrative identification of each type
of process, operation, or production area which contributes wastewater to the
effluent for each outfall, describe any intermittent or seasonal flows, report a
reasonable measure of actual production if an effluent guideline promulgated
under CWA § 304 applies, and describe any abatement requirements or compli-
ance schedules it is subject to. 40 C.F.R. § 122.21(g)(1)-(6) (1993).
27. 40 C.F.R. § 122.21(g)(7) (1993).
28. Id.
29. 40 C.F.R. § 122.21(g)(7)(i)(A) (1993).
30. 40 C.F.R. § 122.21(g)(7)(ii) (1993).
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss1/11
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whether to issue a NPDES permit."31 The Director may
waive reporting requirements for specific pollutants in the
application if she has other adequate information to support
the permit issue.32 A NPDES permit application is complete
when the Director receives a completed application form and
any supplemental information is completed to her
satisfaction.33
CWA section 402 authorizes the EPA Administrator to
grant each state the authority to issue permits as long as the
state permitting requirements are at least as stringent as
those established by the EPA in the NPDES program.34 In
New York, a SPDES permit application must conform to or be
more stringent than all of the requirements for a NPDES per-
mit.3 A state permitting program may have a greater scope
of coverage than required by federal law, but such additional
coverage is not part of the federally approved program.36
Upon approval of a state permitting program, the EPA sus-
pends its issuance of NPDES permits and grants the state
authority to issue permits.37 However, actions to enforce
state permit requirements under a federally approved state
permitting program may be undertaken by the EPA, 38 by the
state issuing the permit,39 or by citizens.40
New York's SPDES program was approved in 1973.41
Section 17-0815(3) of New York's Environmental Conserva-
tion Law requires that all SPDES permits include as a condi-
tion: "that the discharge of any pollutant not identified and
authorized by such permit or the discharge of any pollutant
more frequently than or at a level in excess of that permitted
31. 40 C.F.R. § 122.21(g)(13) (1993).
32. 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.21(g)(7)(i)(B), (g)(9) (1993).
33. 40 C.F.R. § 122.21(e) (1993).
34. CWA § 402(c)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(2).
35. 40 C.F.R. § 123.25(a) (1993).
36. 40 C.F.R. § 123.1(i)(2) (1993).
37. CWA § 402(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c).
38. CWA § 402(i), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(i).
39. CWA § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b).
40. CWA § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365.
41. N.Y. ENVTL. CoNsFiV. LAw § 17-0815 (McKinney 1984).
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by such permit shall constitute a violation of the terms of the
permit."42
A copy of each permit application and each permit issued
under the NPDES or SPDES program must be made avail-
able to the public.43 In addition, section 402 requires that the
permitting authority provide an opportunity for a public
hearing on each application before permit issue.44
The CWA also requires permittees to monitor their dis-
charges by taking samples of their effluents, and to file regu-
lar reports with the EPA Administrator.45 These discharge
monitoring reports (DMRs) are available to the public. 46
These reports must be certified by an authorized representa-
tive of the discharger. 47 The permit holder is also required to
report its own effluent limit violations to the permitting au-
thorities and to the public. 48 In addition to routine reporting
requirements, permittees must notify the Director as soon as
they know or have reason to believe that the discharge of any
toxic pollutant which is not listed in the permit will exceed
prescribed notification levels.49
b. Enforcement of the Clean Water Act Through Citizen
Suits
The CWA authorizes citizens to bring suit in federal dis-
trict court against any person who is alleged to be in violation
of an effluent standard or limitation under the CWA or an
order issued by either the EPA Administrator or a state with
respect to such a standard or limitation.50 The district court
may issue an injunction, apply civil penalties of up to $25,000
per day per violation,51 and award litigation costs to the pre-
42. Id. at § 17-0815(3).
43. CWA, § 402(j), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(j).
44. CWA §§ 402(a)(1), (b)(3), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(a)(1), (b)(3).
45. CWA § 308(a)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1318(a)(A).
46. CWA § 308(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1318(b).
47. 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(k) (1993).
48. 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(1) (1993).
49. 40 C.F.R. § 122.42(a) (1993).
50. CWA § 505(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1).
51. CWA § 309(d), 33 uTS.C. § 1319(d).
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss1/11
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vailing party.52 Most citizen suits are based on violations re-
ported in DMRs.53
c. The Kodak Park Facility
Kodak operates an industrial facility known as Kodak
Park in Rochester, New York.54 Kodak manufactures sensi-
tized film and paper, laboratory chemicals, and other prod-
ucts at this site.55 The facility contains an on-site
wastewater treatment plant that operates twenty-four hours
per day, seven days per week.56 Wastewater treated at the
plant is discharged into the Genesee River and is subject to a
SPDES permit issued by the New York State Department of
Environmental Conservation (DEC).57
Kodak's first permit was a NPDES permit issued by the
EPA in 1975.58 In July 1979, Kodak applied to the DEC to
renew its permit, but the DEC declined to act on the applica-
tion and Kodak's NPDES permit remained in effect. 59 In its
SPDES permit application, Kodak provided the DEC with a
Form 2C describing estimated discharges of 164 substances
from its outfalls and also completed an Industrial Chemical
Survey (ICS).60 The original survey requested information
about 144 substances, but the DEC "restricted the inquiry to
chemicals used in excess of specified minimum levels."61 The
DEC issued Kodak a SPDES permit, effective November 1,
52. CWA § 505(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d).
53. Lisa Cooper, Clean Water Act, in E rmov1umsrAL REPORTING AND RE-
CORDKEEPING REQUIREMENTS 32, 41 (2d ed. 1992).
54. Brief for Defendant-Appellee, supra note 10, at 5.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 6.
57. Id.
58. Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 F.3d
353, 354-55 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3238 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1994)
(No. 93-1839).
59. Id. at 355. If a discharge permit renewal has been applied for under the
CWA and "final administrative disposition of such application has not been
made, such discharge shall not be a violation of (1) Section 1311, 1316, or 1342
of this title, or (2) Section 407 of this title." CWA § 402(k), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k).
This will be true unless the delay was caused by the failure of the applicant to
furnish the information required to complete the application. Id.
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1984, which contains both general conditions and special re-
porting requirements devised to implement both the CWA
and New York Environmental Conservation Law section 17-
0815.62 Kodak's SPDES permit contains effluent limitations
for twenty-five pollutants, and action levels for eight pollu-
tants.6 3 This permit requires that if an action level is ex-
ceeded, the permittee must undertake intensive monitoring
of the pollutant, and if discharge levels higher than the action
levels are confirmed, the permit is to be reopened for consid-
eration of revised action levels or effluent limits.6 4 The per-
mit also contains General Condition 1(b) which states that
"the discharge of any pollutant not identified and authorized
... by this Permit shall constitute a violation of the terms
and conditions of this Permit."6 5
d. Prior Litigation Between the Parties
Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. (ASLF) is a not-
for-profit environmental group based in Syracuse, New
York.66 In the interests of its members re.siding in the Roch-
ester area, ASLF filed suit under CWA section 505.67
ASLF filed its first letter of intent to sue Kodak on April
17, 1989, informing Kodak, the DEC and the EPA that it in-
tended to sue Kodak for violating the terms of its permit.68
ASLF filed its first complaint against Kodak on August 11,
62. Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 F.3d
353, 354 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3238 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1994) (No.
93-1839). By its terms, Kodak's SPDES permit would have expired November
1, 1989 and Kodak applied to renew the SPDES permit in May 1989, but be-
cause the DEC has not issued a final determination on the application, the 1984
permit remains in effect. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 355 n.2.
65. Brief for Defendant-Appellee, supra note 10, at 34.
66. Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 933 F.2d
124, 125 (2d Cir. 1991).
67. Id. at 125.
68. Id. When a party sues under CWA § 505 (a)(1), "[n]o action may be com-
menced.., prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice of the alleged
violation (i) to the Administrator, (ii) to the State in which the alleged violation
occurs, and (iii) to any alleged violator of the standard, limitation, or order."
CWA § 505(b)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A).
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss1/11
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1989, alleging that Kodak violated its SPDES permit by dis-
charging pollutants into the Genesee River and Paddy Hill
Creek in quantities exceeding effluent limitations contained
in the permit.69 ASLF based its accusations on the DMRs
filed with the DEC by Kodak pursuant to its SPDES permit
for the period of March 1, 1987 to May 31, 1989 which re-
vealed at least twenty-seven permit violations, including ex-
cessive discharges of cyanide, xylene, suspended solids,
methylene chloride, lead, zinc, nickel, silver, cadmium,
dichloropropane and chloroform. 70 ASLF sought a declara-
tory judgment as to Kodak's past and ongoing violations, an
injunction against future violations, a court order that autho-
rizes ASLF to test Kodak's discharges for the next year (at
Kodak's expense), access to any documents from Kodak to the
EPA, or the DEC regarding Kodak's permit, maximum civil
penalties under the CWA71 and attorneys' fees and costs. 72
On March 12, 1990, ASLF filed a second notice of intent
to sue Kodak.73 This second notice accused Kodak of dis-
charging pollutants greater than permitted amounts and of
discharging unpermitted pollutants.7 4 On April 5, 1990, Ko-
dak and the DEC agreed to a civil consent order which re-
quired Kodak to pay a penalty of $1,000,000, with $200,000
being designated as a penalty for water pollution violations at
the Rochester facility and another $200,000 for other permit
violations.75 Kodak also agreed to:
submit a report to the DEC summarizing the history of its
operations in Rochester; prepare and submit a manage-
ment practices code in order to enhance public awareness
of the dangers associated with the facility and inform the
public of plans for responding to spills or excess releases;
69. 933 F.2d at 125-26.
70. Id. at 126.
71. See CWA § 309(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d).
72. Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 933 F.2d
124, 126 (2d Cir. 1991); see CWA § 505(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d).
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pay for the costs of on-site monitoring by state employees;
and submit to a comprehensive environmental audit.76
In addition, Kodak pleaded guilty to a two-count criminal
misdemeanor complaint in Rochester City Court, admitting
to one count of unlawful dealing in hazardous wastes and to
one count of failing to notify the DEC of excessive releases in
a timely fashion.77 Kodak also agreed to pay an additional
$1,000,000 fine and $150,000 in support of local emergency
planning.78 New York "released Kodak from further criminal
liability and waived its right to additional penalties for pre-
April 5, 1990 environmental violations at the Rochester
facility."7 9
ASLF filed a third notice of intent to sue Kodak on May
25, 1990, alleging ongoing violations.80 ASLF then moved to
amend its original complaint to include the allegations listed
in the second and third notices. 8 ' On September 18, 1990,
the district court considered the motion to amend the com-
plaint and the cross motions for summary judgment and dis-
missed the complaint, holding that it was rendered moot by
Kodak's agreement with government authorities. 82 ASLF ap-
pealed that judgment, and the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that a citizen suit cannot proceed if the settlement
reached by state officials reasonably assures that the viola-
tions alleged in the citizen suit have ceased and will not re-
cur.8 3 The court also held that a plaintiff in a properly
commenced citizen suit terminated by such a settlement may
76. Id.
77. Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 933 F.2d




81. Id. at 126-27.
82. Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 809 F.
Supp. 1040, 1042 (W.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd 12 F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
63 U.S.L.W. 3238 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1994) (No. 93-1839).
83. Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 933 F.2d
124, 127 (2d Cir. 1991). Citizens may not sue for wholly past violations, but
must allege an ongoing violation. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake
Bay Foundation, Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss1/11
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be entitled to attorneys' fees as a prevailing party.84 The case
was remanded for a determination of whether the settlement
between Kodak and the state had caused the violations al-
leged by ASLF to cease and had eliminated any realistic pros-
pect of their recurrence. 85 After remand, ASLF moved to
amend its complaint to include discharges exceeding levels in
Kodak's SPDES permit which occurred after the filing of the
complaint and discharges not expressly mentioned in the per-
mit.86 The district court granted the motion to include the
exceedances, but denied the motion to include discharges not
mentioned in the permit and the case was then settled.8 7
II. The Second Complaint - The Discharge of
Unlisted Pollutants
A. Procedural History
On November 14, 1991, ASLF again filed suit, alleging
that Kodak was in violation of its SPDES permit and of the
CWA by discharging pollutants that were not specifically au-
thorized on Kodak's SPDES permit since April 1, 1990.88
ASLF based its complaint on information submitted by Ko-
dak on "toxic chemical release forms" (Form Rs).89 Kodak is
required to submit Form Rs to both the EPA and the DEC
under section 313 of the Emergency Planning and Commu-
nity Right-To-Know Act (EPCRTKA).9o Form Rs differ from
DMRs in that they contain estimates of discharges of chemi-
84. 933 F.2d at 127. "[R]easonable attorney and expert witness fees" may
be awarded to the prevailing party, "whenever the court determines such an
award is appropriate." CWA § 505(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d).
85. Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 809 F.
Supp. 1040, 1042 (W.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd, 12 F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. de-
nied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3238 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1994) (No. 93-1839).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1041-42.
89. Id. at 1042.
90. Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 809 F.
Supp. 1040, 1042 n.4 (W.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd, 12 F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3238 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1994) (No. 93-1839) (citing Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act § 313, 42 U.S.C. § 11,023 (1988))
[hereinafter EPCRTKA]. The EPCRTKA is also known as Title I of the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act.
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cals used in the manufacturing process and do not contain
precise measurements based on sampling and analysis of ef-
fluent actually discharged.91 ASLF sought a declaratory
judgment as to Kodak's past and ongoing violations, an in-
junction against future violations, a court order that autho-
rizes ASLF to test Kodak's discharges for the next year (at
Kodak's expense), access to any documents from Kodak to the
EPA or the DEC regarding Kodak's permit, maximum civil
penalties under the CWA, attorneys' fees and costs. 92
After discovery, ASLF moved for summary judgment as
to Kodak's liability in relation to the post-April 1, 1990 dis-
charge of one or more of sixteen of the twenty-seven pollu-
tants listed in the complaint.93 The sixteen pollutants at
issue in the summary judgment motion 94 are listed as toxic
chemicals under the EPCRTKA section 313(c).95 ASLF based
its motion for summary judgment on information regarding
nine of the sixteen substances listed in Kodak's Form Rs sub-
mitted to the EPA for the years 1989-91.96 The remaining
seven substances were listed in Kodak's permit application,
Form 2C or ICS. 97 ASLF argued that General Condition 1(b)
of Kodak's SPDES permit and CWA section 301 prohibit the
91. 809 F. Supp. at 1043. An observer might conclude that ASLF's case
would have been stronger if it had gone to court with reports of actual samples
taken from Kodak's outfalls revealing measured amounts of toxics. However,
the Second Circuit stated that given its disposition of the case, the failure to
produce actual sample analyses was of no consequence. Atlantic States Legal
Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 F.3d 353, 356 n.7 (2d Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3238 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1994) (No. 93-1839).
92. Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 F.3d
353, 356 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3238 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1994) (No.
93-1839).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 356 n.6 (The 16 pollutants are acetonitrile, acetone, dibutyl
phthalate, diethanolamine, ethylene glycol, glycol ethers, manganese, metha-
nol, methyl ethyl ketone, methyl isobutyl ketone, n-butyl alcohol, 1,1,1-
trichloroethane, 1,1,2-trichloroethane, 1,4-dioxane, 2-methoxyethanol, and
toluene.).
95. EPCRTKA § 313(c), 42 U.S.C. § 11,023(c).
96. Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 F.3d
353, 356 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3238 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1994) (No.
93-1839).
97. Id. at 356 n.7.
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discharge of any pollutant not specifically authorized in Ko-
dak's SPDES permit.98
Kodak also moved for summary judgment, asserting that
the CWA does not prohibit the discharge of pollutants not
specifically assigned effluent limitations in a NPDES/SPDES
permit.99 Kodak argued that CWA section 402(k) shielded it
from liability in an enforcement action because it establishes
that compliance with the limitations listed on the permit con-
stitutes compliance with the CWA.1° ° In addition, Kodak ar-
gued that if the permit prohibited such discharges, it would
be a state requirement that is broader than the federal
NPDES permit program and thus not enforceable via a citi-
zen suit.101
On December 28, 1992, the district court denied ASLF's
motion for partial summary judgment, granted Kodak's
cross-motion for summary judgment, and dismissed the
case.10 2 ASLF appealed, and the Second Circuit affirmed the
decision, holding that the discharge of pollutants not listed in
a valid permit issued pursuant to the CWA is not unlawful
under the CWA and that citizens may not bring such a suit to
enforce New York State regulations. 10 3 On October 3, 1994
the Supreme Court denied ASLF's certiorari petition.-0 4
B. The First Issue: The SPDES/NPDES Permit as a
Shield
In reaching its decision that a valid NPDES/SPDES per-
mit shields the discharger from liability for discharging pollu-
tants not listed on the permit, the Second Circuit Court of
98. Id. at 356.
99. Id.
100. Brief for Defendant-Appellee, supra note 10, at 16.
101. Id.
102. Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 809 F.
Supp. 1040, 1047 (W.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd, 12 F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. de-
nied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3238 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1994) (No. 93-1839).
103. Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 F.3d
353, 354 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3238 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1994) (No.
93-1839).
104. Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 63
U.S.L.W. 3238 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1994) (No. 93-1839).
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Appeals first considered whether the plain language of the
CWA prohibits the discharge of any pollutants not expressly
permitted in a NPDES/SPDES permit.10 5 The court found
the relevant CWA section to be section 402(k).106 To interpret
section 402(k), the court relied on a quote from the Supreme
Court in a footnote of the E.I. du Pont de Nemours v. Train10 7
decision.' 08 "[T]he Supreme Court has noted that '[t]he pur-
pose of [Section 402(k)] seems to be . .. to relieve [permit
holders] of having to litigate in an enforcement action the
question whether their permits are sufficiently strict.' 10 9
The court interpreted the footnote to mean that polluters may
discharge pollutants not specifically listed in their NPDES or
SPDES permits if they comply with their reporting require-
ments.110 However, the court left out a significant portion of
the sentence it quoted, a portion which would change the ap-
parent meaning of the sentence. The full sentence is, "[t]he
purpose of section 402(k) seems to be to insulate permit hold-
ers from changes in various regulations during the period of a
permit and to relieve them of having to litigate in an enforce-
ment action the question whether their permits are suffi-
ciently strict."1 1 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in
Inland Steel v. EPA, interpreted the same footnote to mean
"that a permit insulates the permit holder from any change in
the regulation until the change is incorporated into the per-
mit."1 3 -2 Thus, the Seventh Circuit interpreted the permit
shield provision to insulate the permit holder from an en-
forcement action based on a new or more stringent effluent
limitation promulgated after the issuance of a permit before
its incorporation into the permit. This is a much narrower
105. 12 F.3d at 356-57.
106. Id. at 357 (referring to CWA § 402(k), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k)).
107. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 138 n.28 (1977).
108. Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 F.3d
353, 357 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3238 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1994) (No.
93-1839).
109. Id. (citing E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 138
n.28 (1977)).
110. 12 F.3d at 357.
111. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 138 n.28 (1977)
(emphasis added).
112. Inland Steel Co. v. EPA, 574 F.2d 367, 373 (7th Cir. 1978).
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interpretation of section 402(k) than the Second Circuit
reached. In United States v. Ketchikan Pulp Co., the district
court in Alaska also cited Inland Steel and interpreted sec-
tion 402(k) to protect permit holders against retrospective
changes in regulations, not to authorize permit holders to dis-
charge any pollutant not specifically precluded by a
permit.113
The overall structure and thrust of the CWA is forward-
looking toward the goal of eliminating pollution from the na-
tion's waters. 114 It contains provisions that are, by nature,
technology-forcing and anticipate that the EPA will necessar-
ily make revisions in effluent limitations to stay current;
more stringent limitations are encouraged, while backsliding
is forbidden."15 Thus, CWA section 402(k) is needed to pro-
tect permittees from enforcement actions based on new or
more stringent effluent limitations promulgated after the is-
suance of a permit.116
The Second Circuit next considered the EPA's interpreta-
tion of the CWA permitting scheme. 11 7 The court, citing
Chevron, U.SA., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil,118 noted that the "EPA's reasonable interpretations of the
113. United States v. Ketchikan Pulp Co., Civ. Case No. A92-587 (D. Alaska
1992).
114. CWA § 101, 33 U.S.C. § 1251.
115. CWA § 402(o), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(o).
116. CWA § 402(k), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k).
117. Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 F.3d
353, 357 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3238 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1994) (No.
93-1839).
118. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S.
837 (1984). In Chevron, the Court formulated a policy regarding statutory in-
terpretation by an administrative agency when the subject matter of the stat-
ute is complex or beyond the ordinary. To determine if an EPA policy statement
is a reasonable interpretation of the CWA, one must begin with an analysis of
Congressional intent. "If the intent of Congress is clear,... the agency, must
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.... [lhf the stat-
ute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question ... is
whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the stat-
ute." Id. at 842-43. If Congress has expressly left the statute's interpretation
to the agency, any regulatory interpretations will not be altered unless they are
"arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." Id. at 843. Where
Congress implicitly authorized the agency to formulate its own construction,
any reasonable interpretation will stand. Id. at 843-44.
1994] 285
17
286 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12
Act are due deferential treatment in the courts."119 The
court, however, misconstrued the EPA's interpretation of the
CWA when it found that the EPA agreed with Kodak's con-
tention that a NPDES permit authorizes the discharge of pol-
lutants not specifically listed on the permit.
To ascertain the EPA's interpretation of what is author-
ized by a NPDES permit, the court focused primarily on two
memoranda written by EPA officials. 120 The first memoran-
dum was written in 1976 and was from the EPA Deputy As-
sistant Administrator for Water Enforcement to Regional
Enforcement Director, Region V.1-21- It stated that "it is im-
possible to identify and rationally limit every chemical or
compound present in a discharge of pollutants." 22 It further
stated that "compliance with such a permit would be impossi-
ble and anybody seeking to harass a permittee need only ana-
lyze that permittee's discharge until determining the
presence of a substance not identified in the permit." 23 The
second memorandum the court considered was written in
1992 and was from the Director, Office of Wastewater En-
forcement and Compliance to Water Management Division
Directors, Regions I-X.124 It stated that the "EPA did not in-
tend to require water quality-based permit limitations on all
pollutants contained in a discharge ... ."125 The court inter-
preted these memoranda to indicate that the EPA recognized
that industrial facilities may discharge pollutants not listed
on their NPDES/SPDES permits.126 The court's reliance on
internal memoranda from the EPA is in contradiction to the
holding of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Ford Motor
Company v. USEPA.'2 7 In Ford Motor Company, the court
119. 12 F.3d at 358 (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)).
120. Id. at 357.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 F.3d
353, 357 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3238 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1994) (No.
93-1839).
124. Id. at 358.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 359.
127. Ford Motor Co. v. EPA, 567 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1977).
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considered whether the EPA properly vetoed modifications to
Ford's NPDES permit, and held that "ad hoc national policy
determinations developed through internal agency memo-
randa standing alone without promulgating regulations or
guidelines through public notice and/or an opportunity for a
public hearing, are not proper procedures for EPA to enforce
the [CWA]."128 Thus, the Second Circuit's interpretation of
the EPA's internal memoranda should not have been the cor-
nerstone of its decision.
The court also considered a comment made by the EPA in
1980 in the Federal Register pertaining to the proposed appli-
cation-based limits approach to CWA implementation.-2 9 The
application-based limits approach would have required per-
mit holders to adhere to limits on pollutants not expressly
limited in their permits that were based on the anticipated
discharge level for that pollutant reported in their permit ap-
plications.130 The EPA rejected this approach and imple-
mented notification levels.Il3 The comment noted by the
court was that "[there is still some possibility . . .that a
[NPDES or SPDES] permittee may discharge a large amount
of a pollutant not limited in its permit, and EPA will not be
able to take enforcement action against the permittee as long
as the permittee complies with the notification requirements
[pursuant to the CWA]."132 The court noted that the EPA, in
the comment, called this possibility a "regulatory gap,"133 and
that the EPA noted that "the final regulations control dis-
charges only of the pollutants listed in the [NPDES or
SPDES] permit application .... 1 34 The court interpreted
this to indicate that the EPA supported Kodak's position -
128. Id. at 671-72.
129. Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 F.3d
353, 358 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3238 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1994) (No.
93-1839) (referring to 45 Fed. Reg. 33,523 (1980)).
130. 45 Fed. Reg. 33,522-23 (1980).
131. Id. at 33,523.
132. 12 F.3d at 358 (citing 45 Fed. Reg. 33,523).
133. 12 F.3d at 358.
134. Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 F.3d
353, 358 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3238 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1994) (No.
93-1839) (quoting 45 Fed. Reg. 33,523) (alteration in original).
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that a NPDES permit acts as an authorization to discharge
pollutants as long as the permit holder complies with the ex-
pressly stated limits on the permit and complies with notifi-
cation requirements for pollutants not mentioned on the
permit.1 35
It would seem more accurate to characterize the com-
ment in the Federal Register as illustrating the EPA's sup-
port for the position that declaration of pollutant discharges
in a permit application absolves a discharger from liability
for the discharge of that pollutant later, even if not expressly
limited on the NPDES permit. This interpretation comports
with the litigation position taken by the EPA in United States
v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co.136 Tennessee Gas argued that
it was shielded from an enforcement action for discharging
PCBs into Lake Sibley, Louisiana because PCBs were not ex-
pressly limited on its NPDES permit.1 37 The U.S. argued
that Tennessee Gas could not be shielded from discharging
PCBs because it had not disclosed them on the permit
application. 138
The U.S. also took this position in United States v. Ketch-
ikan Pulp Co.139 The U.S. argued that Ketchikan Pulp could
not use its NPDES permit as a shield for discharging red li-
quor, cooking acid and magnesium oxide, all pollutants which
were not listed on its permit, when Ketchikan had not re-
vealed the discharges in its permit application.1 40
135. 12 F.3d at 358.
136. Ruling, United States v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company, No. 91-1428
(W.D. La. 1991) (included in the addendum of supplemental authority in Brief
for Plaintiff-Appellant, Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman Ko-
dak Co., 12 F. 3d 353 (2d Cir. 1993) (No. 93-7091)).
137. Id. at A4.
138. Id. at A5, n.4.
139. Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Partial Sum-
mary Judgment and in Support of United States' Cross-Motion for Partial Sum-
mary Judgment at A7, United States v. Ketchikan Pulp Co., Civ. Case No. A92-
587 (D. Alaska 1992) (included in addendum of supplemental authority in Brief
for Plaintiff-Appellant, Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman Ko-
dak Co., 12 F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 1993) (No. 93-7091)).
140. Id. at A7-A8.
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Although ASLF cited both of these arguments in its
brief,141 the court declined to give them any weight, calling
them "inapposite" and stating that one citation was to a
"court's summary of the U.S. Attorney's argument in a foot-
note to an unpublished opinion in the Western District of
Louisiana" and the other citation was to "a U.S. Attorney's
brief in an Alaska case, not signed by any EPA lawyer."142
The court should not have dismissed these arguments. Both
cases arose out of enforcement actions taken by the EPA,
thus the arguments put forth by the U.S. Attorneys in both
cases reflect litigation positions taken by the EPA. The court
should have accepted the litigation position as being the
agency's interpretation of the NPDES permitting scheme
under the CWA. The Supreme Court, in Martin v. Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Review Commission, 43 noted "that
agency 'litigating positions' are not entitled to deference
when they are merely appellate counsel's 'post hoc rationali-
zation' for agency action, advanced for the first time in the
reviewing court," 44 but held that a citation issued by the Sec-
retary of Labor under OSHA, i.e, an enforcement action, "is
agency action, not a post hoc rationalization of it."145 Thus,
the litigation position taken by the U.S. in both Tennessee
Gas and Ketchikan Pulp reflects the EPA's interpretation of
the NPDES permitting scheme under the CWA.
Kodak distinguished itself from Tennessee Gas by point-
ing out that Tennessee Gas did not disclose in its permit ap-
plication that it would be discharging the pollutant at issue
141. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 25, Atlantic States Legal Foundation
Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 1993) (No. 93-7091).
142. Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 F.3d
353, 358 n.9 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3238 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1994)
(No. 93-1839).
143. 499 U.S. 144 (1991). This argument was made, and this case cited, in
the Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment and in Support of United States' Cross-Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment at 8, United States v. Ketchikan Pulp Co., Civ. Case No. A92-587 (D.
Alaska 1992) (included in addendum of supplemental authority in Brief for
Plaintiff-Appellant, Atlantic States Legal foundation, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 12 F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 1993) (No. 93-7091)).
144. 499 U.S. at 156.
145. Id. at 157.
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in the enforcement action and claimed that, in contrast, Ko-
dak fully complied with all permit application require-
ments.146 However, nine of the sixteen substances listed in
ASLF's motion for summary judgment against Kodak may
not have received regulatory inquiry by the DEC in the per-
mitting process due to Kodak's failure to disclose their pres-
ence in the waste stream on its NPDES permit application.147
The court ignored this fact, mentioning in a footnote that the
nine substances appeared on Kodak's Form R's, the source of
ASLF's information, and were subject to DEC regulation. 48
Apparently, the court found compliance with the EPCRTKA
to be equivalent to disclosure of pollutants on a NPDES per-
mit application. However, nothing in the regulations gov-
erning NPDES permit applications suggests that compliance
with other environmental regulations releases a discharger
from making full and accurate disclosure of all pollutants in
its wastestream on its NPDES permit application.
The court, in finding that the EPA's interpretation of the
NPDES permitting scheme supports Kodak's argument -
that a NPDES permit authorizes the discharge of any pollu-
tant not expressly limited on the permit - attributed to the
EPA an interpretation that the agency does not support. Ko-
dak's position would reward a discharger for failing to fully
and accurately disclose all pollutants present in a discharge
by granting a shield from liability for any pollutant not men-
tioned in the application if it is also not mentioned on the
permit. The EPA's opposition to this position was clearly
stated by the U.S. Attorney in a brief in the Ketchikan Pulp
case: "[t]his argument is contrary to the language and pur-
pose of the Act. It would transform every NPDES permit
from a limited authorization to discharge into a practically
unlimited license to pollute, useless as a means of water pol-
146. Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 23, Atlantic States Legal Foundation,
Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 1993) (No. 93-7091).
147. Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 F.3d





lution control."149 Nevertheless, the court found the EPA to
be in agreement with Kodak on its interpretation of the
NPDES permit as a shield, and found the interpretation to be
reasonable, while finding ASLF's interpretation to be "absolu-
tist and wholly impractical."150
Alternatively, the court could have viewed the EPA's ap-
parent policy to pursue enforcement actions only against dis-
chargers who fail to disclose the presence of pollutants in a
NPDES permit application or who violate specified regula-
tory limits, as merely an exercise of the EPA's prosecutorial
discretion in enforcing the CWA, rather than as the EPA's in-
terpretation of the legal significance of a NPDES permit. 151
CWA section 505 does not compel citizens to abide by the
EPA's selective enforcement criteria in their suits to enforce
effluent standards or limitations under the CWA. Citizens
may bring suits to pursue violators who are not being dili-
gently prosecuted by the government. 152 In enacting the
CWA citizen suit provision, Congress recognized that the gov-
ernment had limited resources for enforcement actions and
intended for citizens to supplement government CWA en-
forcement efforts.
In July 1994, in response to questions regarding its posi-
tion on the NPDES permit shield issue, the EPA distributed
to its regional administrators and regional counsels a memo-
randum entitled "Policy Statement on Scope of Discharge Au-
thorization and Shield Associated with NPDES Permits." 53
In this policy statement, the EPA states that the NPDES per-
mit will authorize, within the limits and subject to the condi-
149. Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Partial Sum-
mary Judgment and in Support of United States' Cross-Motion for Partial Sum-
mary Judgment at 2, United States v. Ketchikan Pulp Co., Civ. Case No. A92-
587 (D. Alaska 1992) (included in addendum of supplemental authority in Brief
for Plaintiff-Appellant, Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman Ko-
dak Co., 12 F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 1993) (No. 93-7091)).
150. Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 F.3d
353, 357 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3238 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1994) (No.
93-1839).
151. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
152. CWA § 505(a), (b), 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (a), (b).
153. Perciasepe Memorandum, supra note 14.
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tions set forth in the permit, the discharge of pollutants
which have been specifically limited in the permit or pollu-
tants which the permit, fact sheet, or administrative record
explicitly identify as controlled through indicator parame-
ters; pollutants for which the permit authority has not estab-
lished limits or other permit conditions, but which are
specifically identified as present in facility discharges during
the permit application process; and pollutants not identified
as present but which are constituents of wastestreams, oper-
ations or processes that were clearly identified during the
permit application process.15 4 The memorandum addition-
ally states that the EPA will review its position on the scope
of the shield provided by section 402(k) and that the EPA
plans to update the NPDES application regulations with a
proposal for changes to the municipal application require-
ments in 1994 and a proposal for changes to industrial appli-
cation requirements in 1995.155
A Chevron analysis1 56 of the EPA's policy reveals that it
is in keeping with Congressional intent behind the CWA and,
therefore, is a reasonable construction of the statute. In CWA
section 301, Congress stated that the discharge of a pollutant
by a person without a permit shall be unlawful.157 Section
402 authorizes the EPA Administrator to issue a permit for
the discharge of any pollutant or combination of pollutants
upon conditions that such discharge will meet certain stan-
dards.158 The plain words of these two sections indicate that
Congress intended to make the discharge of pollutants un-
lawful except for those pollutants specifically authorized in a
NPDES permit. In the words of Chevron, "the intent of Con-
gress is clear... [and] that is the end of the matter." 59 Ad-
ding the words of section 402(k) to the analysis does little to
dispel this interpretation. Section 402(k) merely states that
154. Id. at 2.
155. Id. at 4.
156. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S.
837 (1984); see also supra text accompanying note 118.
157. CWA § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
158. CWA § 402(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a).




compliance with a permit shall be deemed compliance with
the CWA.160 The plain words of section 402(k) indicate that,
although the discharge of a pollutant is unlawful under sec-
tion 301, if the discharge of the pollutant is authorized by a
permit, the discharger will be deemed to be in compliance
with the CWA.161 Thus, the plain words of the statute indi-
cate that a NPDES permit acts as a limited authorization to
discharge pollutants. The question remains, if a particular
pollutant is not listed on a permit, can the permit act as an
authorization to discharge it?
The EPA's policy answers this question with yes - if the
pollutant was either explicitly or implicitly identified by the
discharger as being present in its effluent on the NPDES per-
mit application. 162 This policy provides an incentive to indus-
trial dischargers to make a full disclosure of all pollutants it
anticipates will be present in its effluent at the time of the
application. Such full disclosure furthers the Congressional
objectives of the CWA. Congress declared the objective of the
Act is to achieve "the national goal that the discharge of pol-
lutants into the navigable waters be eliminated." 63 In sec-
tion 1251(e), Congress stated that "[p]ublic participation...
shall be provided for, encouraged, and assisted by the Admin-
istrator and the States."164 As a means of achieving these
goals, Congress set forth a statutory basis for the NPDES
permits. 65 The Supreme Court has found that the "[NPDES]
permit defines, and facilitates compliance with, and enforce-
ment of, a preponderance of a discharger's obligations under
the [CWA]."l66 Thus, the importance of the NPDES permits
in the goal of elimination of water pollution cannot be
overstated.
160. CWA § 402(k), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k).
161. Id.
162. Perciasepe Memorandum, supra note 14.
163. CWA § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
164. CWA § 101(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(e).
165. CWA § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342.
166. Environmental Protection Agency v. California ex rel. State Water Re-
sources Control Board, 426 U.S. 200, 205 (1976).
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In addition, "[t]he NPDES program fundamentally relies
on self-monitoring."167 The role that self-monitoring plays in
the permitting and enforcement processes dictates that com-
plete and accurate disclosure of pollutants in industrial dis-
charges be required on the NPDES permit application in
order to implement Congressional intent. The EPA designed
the application requirements for a NPDES permit to elicit
full disclosure of pollutants present in a discharge. 168 As the
EPA argued in Ketchikan Pulp, "[t]he failure of permit appli-
cants to accurately describe their proposed discharges fatally
undermines this program. Obviously, if the applicant does
not inform EPA of a discharge, EPA cannot determine
whether it should impose conditions to control or eliminate
it."169
In addition, the regulations promulgated by the EPA to
carry out the Congressional intent of providing for public par-
ticipation in the regulation of water pollution would become
ineffective if dischargers were rewarded for failing to give full
disclosure of all anticipated pollutants in their permit appli-
cations. The NPDES permit application is open to inspection
by the public, and the permit is not issued without the oppor-
tunity for a public hearing.170 Thus public participation and
comments are an integral part of the permitting process. Cit-
izens cannot comment on pollutants if they do not have fair
notice that the pollutants exist. Without fair and accurate
disclosure of all anticipated pollutants in the effluent, the
public is denied participation in the process of eliminating all
pollutants. Therefore, the EPA's policy, by providing an in-
centive to dischargers to disclose all pollutants in their waste
167. Sierra Club v. Union Oil Co. of California, 813 F.2d 1480, 1491 (9th Cir.
1987), vacated on other grounds, 485 U.S. 931 (1988).
168. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.21 and supra section I for a description of NPDES
permit application requirements.
169. Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Partial Sum-
mary Judgment and in Support of United States' Cross-Motion for Partial Sum-
mary Judgment at A17, United States v. Ketchikan Pulp Co., Civ. Case No.
A92-587 (D. Alaska 1992) (included in addendum of supplemental authority in
Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 12 F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 1993) (No. 93-7091)).
170. CWA §§ 402(a)(1), (b)(3), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(a)(1), (b)(3).
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streams in the NPDES permit application, furthers Congres-
sional intent and is a reasonable interpretation of the CWA
and an aid in enforcement.
However, this policy must be accompanied by careful
scrutiny of the application by the permitting authority during
the permitting process, by promulgation and implementation
of continually updated effluent guidelines for an increasingly
broad range of pollutants, and by rigorous enforcement to
make the NPDES permit function as an effective tool in elim-
inating pollutants from the nation's waters. As the EPA re-
views the NPDES permit application regulations and effluent
guidelines, 171 careful consideration should be given to the
level of detail required of a permittee in a permit application,
in the effluent limits imposed in the permits, and in compli-
ance monitoring required. Dischargers often make "impossi-
bility" the focus of their arguments in their battle against
tight environmental regulations. 72 The memoranda Kodak
chose to present to the court in support of this argument were
written up to eighteen years ago. The EPA and the courts
should not ignore scientific advances and the increased ease
with which computerized sampling techniques can reveal the
presence of even trace amounts of chemicals in a waste
stream. It should not be assumed that scientific limitations
that existed decades ago preclude today's full and accurate
disclosure and regulation of pollutants. It is the stated goal
171. See 59 Fed. Reg. 25,859 (describing the EPA's proposed plans for revis-
ing and developing effluent guidelines). "To ensure that effluent guidelines re-
main current with the state of the industry and with available control
technologies, sec. 304(b) of the Act provides that EPA shall revise the effluent
guidelines at least annually if appropriate. In addition, sec. 301(d) provides
that EPA shall review and if appropriate, revise any effluent limitation re-
quired by sec. 301(b)(2)." Id. at 25,861. In 1992, EPA established an effluent
Guidelines Task Force, an advisory committee with members from industry,
citizen groups, state and local government, the academic and scientific commu-
nities, and EPA regional offices to recommend improvements to the effluent
guidelines program. Id. at 25,865. EPA established the Task Force pursuant to
a consent decree in NRDC v. Reilly, Civ. No. 89-2980 (D.D.C. 1992). Id. at
25,862.
172. Amicus Brief of the Chemical Manufacturers Association, The Chamber
of Commerce of the United States, The American Petroleum Institute, and the
American Forest and Paper Association at 13-14, Atlantic States Legal Founda-
tion, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 1993) (No. 93-7091).
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of the CWA to eliminate the discharge of pollutants into navi-
gable waters, not merely to limit their discharge.17 3 As sci-
ence advances, more stringent regulations should be enacted
and the courts should support them.17 4 Section 402(k) will
serve its proper function by shielding permittees from en-
forcement actions based on regulations enacted after their
permits were issued.
C. The Second Issue: Citizen Suits to Enforce State
Programs
Having interpreted the CWA to shield Kodak from liabil-
ity under federal law for discharging pollutants not listed in
its NPDES permit, the court turned its attention to New York
regulations and held that "states' standards may be enforced
under the CWA by the states or the EPA... but private citi-
zens have no standing to do so." 7' 5 The court examined the
terms of Kodak's SPDES permit, and found conflicting provi-
sions. The final clause of General Condition 1(b), required
under New York law, states that "the discharge of any pollu-
tant not identified and authorized or the discharge of any pol-
lutant more frequently than or at a level in excess of that
identified and authorized by this permit shall constitute a vi-
olation of the terms and conditions of this permit." 7 6 How-
ever, the court found other wording on the permit, in General
Condition 1(b) and in Special Reporting Requirement 2(a),
which allude to discharges of pollutants not identified by the
permit. 7 7 Both provisions require that Kodak notify the
DEC if it discharges pollutants that it did not report on its
SPDES permit application.
The court also considered the fact that the DEC notified
Kodak in September, 1988, that it was aware of forty-five
173. CWA § 101(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1).
174. See Duquesne Light Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 698 F. 2d
456 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (technical impossibilities are not a condition for exemption
from the Clean Air Act).
175. Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 F.3d
353, 358 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3238 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1994) (No.
93-1839).
176. Id. at 359 n.10.
177. Id. at 359.
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substances released into the Genesee River out of which only
twenty-three were specifically limited or monitored by the
SPDES permit. 178 The DEC advised Kodak to give additional
attention to only four of these.17 9 The court interpreted this
response by the DEC to indicate that the "DEC's view of the
SPDES permit is the same as the EPA's." °80 In the same way
that the court misinterpreted the EPA's view of the NPDES
permit, the court misinterpreted the DEC's view of a SPDES
permit. The court seemed to take the permit provisions and
the actions taken by the DEC in regard to Kodak's discharge
of pollutants not listed on its SPDES permit - provisions and
actions designed to elicit full disclosure of the pollutants pres-
ent in the discharge - to show that New York law does not
prohibit the discharge of pollutants not listed on a SPDES
permit.
However, the court stated that it did not have to resolve
the issue, because if New York law does prohibit the dis-
charge of pollutants not listed on the SPDES permit, the New
York law is not enforceable through a citizen suit under CWA
section 505.181 The court relied on 40 C.F.R. § 123.1(i)(2)
which states that "[ilf an approved State program has greater
scope of coverage than required by Federal law the additional
coverage is not part of the Federally approved program." 8 2
Because the court found that the CWA allows the dis-
charge of pollutants not expressly limited on a NPDES per-
mit, the court held that a state permitting plan that prohibits
the discharge of pollutants not listed on a SPDES permit
would have greater scope of coverage than is required by the
CWA.183 Thus, the court reasoned that the additional cover-
age would not be part of the federally approved program and
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 F.3d
353, 359 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3238 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1994) (No.
93-1839).
181. Id. at 359-60.
182. Id. at 359 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 123.1(i)(2) (1993)).
183. 12 F.3d at 359.
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would not be enforceable through a citizen suit under CWA
section 505.184
In reaching this conclusion, the court apparently gave no
merit to the arguments put forth in the brief by the State of
New York as Amicus Curiae. The state argued that because
the CWA allows states to add their own requirements to their
permitting programs so long as such requirements are "not
less stringent than those of the Act," and because the CWA
provides for federal enforcement of SPDES permits, a citizen
suit may be brought under the CWA to enforce provisions of a
SPDES permit that are "not less stringent than required by
federal law."185 The state further argued that the General
Condition 1(b) of the SPDES permit does not provide broader
scope of coverage than is required by federal law, even if the
court construed it to be more stringent than required by fed-
eral law.186 The state cited the example given in the regula-
tions illustrating what is meant by "greater scope of
coverage."1 87 The example states: "[i]f a State requires per-
mits for discharges into publicly owned treatment works,
these permits are not NPDES permits."188 The example illus-
trates a situation in which a state imposes a permit require-
ment for a group of dischargers that would not be subject to
NPDES permit requirements under federal law. Thus, the
phrase "greater scope of coverage" in the regulation seems to
refer to expanded jurisdiction, not to more stringent require-
ments. The state also attached to its brief as a supporting
document the letter from the EPA Administrator granting
approval of the New York SPDES permitting program.1 89 In
the letter, the EPA Administrator explicitly emphasized the
authority of the federal government to enforce the terms of
the New York SPDES permits. 190 Thus, it appears that the
184. Id. at 359-60.
185. Brief for State of New York as Amicus Curiae at 4, Atlantic States Legal
Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 1993) (No. 93-
7091) [hereinafter New York Amicus Brief].
186. Id.
187. Id. at 14.
188. Id. at 15.
189. Id. at A-5.
190. New York Amicus Brief, supra note 185, at 4.
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General Condition 1(b) on New York's SPDES permits is con-
sidered by EPA to be part of the federally approved program
under the CWA.
While the court cited policy implications in its holding on
the permit shield issue, it did not do so on this issue, appar-
ently ignoring the state's policy arguments in its brief. The
state argued that the enactment of more stringent require-
ments than are required by federal law does not take the
SPDES program out of the realm of the federal program and
that a decision to the contrary frustrates "the right granted to
the States under the [CWA] to enact stricter standards than
those imposed by Congress."191 The state also argued that
enforcement programs would be frustrated if the decision
meant that "a State would have to bring a separate action to
enforce those provisions that are stricter than those of the
federal program."192 Thus, the effects of this holding could be
quite significant, and the issue is bound to be the subject of
future litigation.193
III. Conclusion
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in holding that a
NPDES permit shields the permittee from liability for dis-
charging pollutants that are not listed on the permit, misin-
terpreted the wording of the CWA, attributed to the EPA a
position that the EPA does not support, and frustrated Con-
191. Id. at 2-3.
192. Id. at 3.
193. While Kodak managed to emerge the victor in this suit and deal a blow
to the CWA in the process, it has not been able to escape liability for its pollu-
tion of the Genesee River. On October 8, 1994 the New York Times reported
that Kodak, "threatened with a federal lawsuit under the Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act of 1976... agreed to pay a $5 million fine and spend tens
of millions more to repair sewers and cut the use of toxic chemicals at its manu-
facturing plant" in Kodak Park. James C. McKinley Jr., Kodak Is Fined $5
Million For Toxic Chemical Leaks, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 8, 1994, at 29. The article
also reported that Kodak "agreed to spend $12 million to reduce or eliminate
the use of toxic chemicals such as methanol, toluene, formaldehyde and
chlorofluorocarbons." Id. Although the President of the Kodak Vista Neighbor-
hood Association cited health concerns, a Kodak Vice President was quoted as
saying "W[this settlement is not about human health nor major environmental
impact. It's about compliance with complex regulations." Id.
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gressional intent behind the NPDES permitting system. In
contrast, the EPA's current policy -that a NPDES permit
shields the permittee from liability for discharging pollutants
not listed on the permit only when the pollutants were fully
disclosed in the permit application process - is a reasonable
interpretation of the CWA and will further efforts to elimi-
nate pollutants from the nation's waters if it is accompanied
by vigorous efforts to set a broad range of continuously up-
dated effluent limitations and strict enforcement.
In holding that citizens are barred from pursuing en-
forcement actions to enforce a SPDES permit provision
prohibiting the discharge of pollutants not specifically listed
on the permit, the court misinterpreted the regulations im-
plementing the State NPDES programs under the CWA. In
addition, the court's decision frustrates the right granted to
states under the CWA to enact more stringent requirements
than are required by federal law and keep these require-
ments within the federally approved program, seriously com-
plicating enforcement programs for SPDES permits.
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